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Abstract
Commonly used instruments for the identification of monetary policy disturb-
ances are likely to combine the true policy shock with information about the state
of the economy due to the information disclosed through the policy action. We
show that this signalling effect of monetary policy can give rise to the empirical
puzzles reported in the literature, and propose a new high-frequency instrument
for monetary policy shocks that accounts for informational rigidities. We find
that a monetary tightening is unequivocally contractionary, with deterioration of
domestic demand, labor and credit market conditions, as well as of asset prices
and agents’ expectations.
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Introduction
A major recent advancement in the empirical literature on the transmission of monetary
policy shocks has been the adoption of external instruments thought to provide direct
measures of the structural policy disturbances, e.g. the narrative instrument proposed
by Romer and Romer (2004), or the market surprises of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) as used
in Gertler and Karadi (2015). However, as documented in Coibion (2012) and in Ramey
(2016), the estimated dynamic responses to monetary policy shocks can be sensitive
to the choice of the instrument, sample, and empirical specification. In this paper we
propose an explanation for such instabilities that is based on models of imperfect inform-
ation, and propose an identification strategy that is robust to the presence of information
frictions in the economy. We argue that accounting for such informational rigidities is
crucial to understand some of the puzzles in the literature. Information asymmetries
between the public and the central bank can in fact give rise to an ‘information channel’
for monetary policy actions (see Romer and Romer, 2000; Melosi, 2017; Tang, 2013):
to informationally constrained agents, a policy rate hike can signal either a deviation of
the central bank from its monetary policy rule – i.e. a contractionary monetary shock –,
or stronger than expected fundamentals to which the monetary authority endogenously
responds. Empirical specifications that do not take into account information frictions,
and that therefore do not disentangle these two scenarios, are likely to retrieve dynamic
responses that confound the effects of a monetary policy shock with the endogenous
response of the central bank to changes in the economy, leading to the well-known price
and activity puzzles.
As observed in Blinder et al. (2008), imperfect and asymmetric information between
the public and the central bank are the norm, not the exception, in monetary policy.1
However, while this observation has informed many theoretical attempts to include
informational imperfections in the modelling of monetary policy, it has been largely
1Our methodology builds on the insights provided by models of imperfect – noisy and sticky –
information and asymmetric information (e.g. Woodford, 2001; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Sims, 2003;
Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) and, empirically, combines insights from Romer and Romer (2004)’s
narrative identification identification and the high-frequency identification (HFI) of Gertler and Karadi
(2015). Reviews on models of imperfect information and learning in monetary policy are in Mankiw
and Reis (2010), Sims (2010), and Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2010).
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disregarded in the empirical identification of the shocks. Indeed, popular instruments
for monetary policy shocks that are constructed in leading identification schemes can be
thought of as assuming that either the central bank (e.g. Romer and Romer, 2004) or
market participants (e.g. Gertler and Karadi, 2015) enjoy perfect information. Under
these assumptions, controlling for the information set of the perfectly informed agent is
sufficient to identify the shock. However, if all agents in the economy enjoyed full inform-
ation, different instruments would deliver identical results. On the contrary, responses
may diverge with dispersed information.
This paper provides evidence of the presence of information frictions that are rel-
evant for monetary policy, and discusses their implications for the identification of the
shocks. We proceed in steps. In Section 1, we show in a stylised model how imperfect in-
formation can invalidate commonly used instruments, and provide testable implications
of the presence of information frictions. In Section 2, we formally test for the presence
of information frictions in leading instruments for monetary policy shocks and provide
evidence in line with the predictions of our simple model. First, high-frequency instru-
ments – a measure of the revision of market-based expectations that follows a monetary
announcement –, are predictable and autocorrelated (see also Ramey, 2016). We inter-
pret this as an indication of the sluggish adjustment of expectations, in line with what
documented for different types of economic agents using survey data.2,3 This is the emer-
ging feature of models of imperfect information. Second, high-frequency market-based
surprises around policy announcements correlate with central banks’ private macroeco-
nomic forecasts (see also Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Ramey,
2016). We think of this as evidence of the signalling channel discussed in Melosi (2017)
– i.e. the transfer of central banks’ private information implicitly disclosed through
policy actions, and due to the information asymmetry between private agents and the
central bank (Romer and Romer, 2000). Finally, we show that narrative surprises, ob-
tained with respect to the central bank’s information set only (Romer and Romer, 2004;
2See, for example, Mankiw et al. (2004), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2015), and Andrade and Le Bihan (2013).
3Looking at financial markets, Gourinchas and Tornell (2004), Piazzesi et al. (2015), Bacchetta
et al. (2009) and Cieslak (2016) have connected systematic forecast errors in survey forecasts to puzzles
in financial markets.
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Cloyne and Hu¨rtgen, 2016), are equally affected by informational frictions. Specifically,
they are autocorrelated, predictable by past information, and may contain anticipated
policy shifts – e.g. forwards guidance announcements.
Taking stock of this evidence, in Section 3 we define monetary policy shocks as
exogenous shifts in the policy instrument that surprise market participants, are unfore-
castable, and are not due to the central bank’s systematic response to its own assessment
of the macroeconomic outlook. Accordingly, we construct an instrument for monetary
policy shocks by projecting market-based monetary surprises on their own lags, and on
the central bank’s information set, as summarised by Greenbook forecasts.4
We use this informationally-robust instrument to identify the shocks in a SVAR-IV
(see Stock and Watson, 2012, 2018; Mertens and Ravn, 2013). We start by showing in
Section 4 that in a standardly specified monetary VAR such as e.g. the one in Coibion
(2012), and contrary to other leading instruments, our identification does not give rise
to either output or price puzzles. We also show that the endogenous component in
high-frequency monetary surprises – that is due to the information channel –, produces
in the VAR responses that are compatible with the effects of aggregate demand shocks
that the central bank is likely to respond to. In Section 5 we then study the transmission
of monetary policy shocks on a large and heterogenous set of both macroeconomic and
financial variables, as well as on private sector forecasts, and medium and long-term
interest rates. We find that a monetary contraction is unequivocally and significantly
recessionary. The contraction in output is sudden, significant and larger than reported
in previous studies. It is accompanied by a contraction in prices, and there is no evid-
ence of puzzles. We document evidence compatible with many of the standard channels
of monetary transmission, and reflected in a deterioration of prices, domestic demand,
4Market-based monetary surprises are the high-frequency price revisions in traded interest rates fu-
tures that are triggered by a policy announcement. In using financial markets instruments to measure
the unexpected component of monetary policy we connect to a large literature pioneered by Rude-
busch (1998), Kuttner (2001) and Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) and whose notable contributions include,
among others, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Gu¨rkaynak (2005); Hamilton, Pruitt and Borger (2011);
Gilchrist, Lo´pez-Salido and Zakrajˇsek (2015); Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano and Melosi (2016); Caldara
and Herbst (2019). Thapar (2008) and Barakchian and Crowe (2013) have proposed identifications
based on monetary surprises that control for the central bank’s internal forecasts. Differently from
these papers, our methodology incorporates intuition stemming from models of imperfect information.
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labor market conditions, investments, and household wealth (e.g. Mishkin, 1996). We
analyse in detail the response of interest rates at short, medium, and very long matur-
ities and find important but very short-lived effects of policy on the yield curve (Romer
and Romer, 2000; Ellingsen and Soderstrom, 2001). Also, we find evidence of a powerful
credit channel that magnifies the size of the economic contraction through the responses
of both credit and financial markets (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Gertler and Karadi,
2015; Caldara and Herbst, 2019). Moreover, we document a deterioration of the external
position sustained by a significant appreciation of the domestic currency. The expect-
ational channel is also activated: following a contractionary monetary policy shock,
agents revise their macroeconomic forecasts in line with the deteriorating fundamentals.
Finally, in Section 6 we assess the model and sample dependence of our results and
their sensitivity to model misspecification. Indeed, this is an important concern in the
literature. As thoroughly discussed in Ramey (2016), other than on the chosen iden-
tification strategy, the sign of the responses of crucial variables such as output and
prices depends on the sample and empirical specification adopted, and on whether the
dynamic responses are obtained from standard VAR models or from Local Projections
(LP) methods. We compare results from three empirical specifications: a vector autore-
gression (VAR), a standard local projection method (LP) (Jorda`, 2005), and a Bayesian
version of Local Projections, that optimally balances between bias and estimation vari-
ance, and that we label Bayesian Local Projection (BLP). The rationale for this test
is as follows. Low-order VARs with small set of controls that are often used in the
empirical literature are likely to be misspecified; in this case, the bias in the estimated
coefficients is compounded over the horizons. On the other hand, Local Projection IRFs
have the desirable property of being potentially robust to misspecification. This flexib-
ility, however, comes with the added cost of quickly drying up degrees of freedom, with
consequential high estimation uncertainty particularly in small samples. A Bayesian ap-
proach to Local Projection (BLP) retains the flexibility of LP, and hence the robustness
to model (mis)specification, while at the same time efficiently dealing with estimation
uncertainty.5 We document that in small models and for short samples, residual puzzles
5BLP responses are estimated using conjugate priors either extending the Minnesota prior approach
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may still arise because of the limited ability standard methods to cope with either mis-
specification (VAR) or estimation uncertainty (LP), even after having corrected the
monetary policy instrument for the information transfer. However, Bayesian Local Pro-
jection deliver results that are stable over time, and seldom display puzzles.6 We look at
this as a further indication of the robustness of our findings even for severely misspecified
models.
This paper fits in the recent literature that explores the implications of the informa-
tion effects of monetary policy announcements. Two closely related papers are Jarocin´ski
and Karadi (2019) and Cieslak and Schrimpf (2019). These use a combination of high-
frequency responses of asset prices and sign restrictions to separate monetary policy
shocks from other news shocks, and produce complementary evidence of contamination
of high-frequency surprises by information on other macroeconomic shocks. With sim-
ilar techniques, Andrade and Ferroni (2016) extract the information content of forward
guidance announcements in the Euro Area. Differently from these works, our approach
does not require the use of sign restrictions, and provides a readily employable instru-
ment for monetary policy shocks. Moreover, while these works focus on the content of
monetary policy announcements as perceived by market participants, in our approach
we explicitly model and control for the information transfer. In doing so, we expand on
the approach of Campbell et al. (2012) that proposed to use (agents) expectations as
represented by survey data to capture the information effects in (or Delphic component
of) forward guidance announcements.
or, alternatively, centred around an iterated VAR estimated on a pre-sample. Intuitively, the prior gives
weight to the belief that economic time series processes can be described in first approximation by linear
models such as VARs. Extending the argument in Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2015), we treat the
overall informativeness of the priors as an additional model parameter for which we specify a prior
distribution, and choose it as the maximiser of the posterior likelihood. As a result, the posterior mean
of BLP IRFs is an optimally weighted combination of VAR and LP-based IRFs.
6While not ruling out the possibility of time-variation in the transmission coefficients of monetary
policy (see Primiceri, 2005), our results show that the effects of monetary policy are more stable than
previously reported.
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1 A Simple Model of Noisy Information
Two implications of models of imperfect information are important for the identification
of monetary policy shocks. First, as observed in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015),
a common prediction of models of imperfect information is that average expectations
respond more gradually to shocks to fundamentals than do the variables being forecasted.
This implies that revisions of expectations – and importantly movements in market
prices – can be correlated over time, and contain information on both current and
past structural shocks. Second, due to the asymmetry of information between policy
makers and market participants, observable policy actions can convey information about
fundamentals (see Melosi, 2017; Romer and Romer, 2000). In this section we introduce
a simple model of noisy and asymmetric information that can account for these features
and provide intuition for our approach.7
Let us consider an economy whose k-dimensional vector of macroeconomic funda-
mentals evolves following an autoregressive process
xt = ρxt−1 + ξt ξt ∼ N (0,Σξ) . (1)
ξt is the vector of structural shocks. Any period t is divided into two stages. An opening
stage
¯
t, and a closing stage t¯. At
¯
t, shocks are realised. Agents and central banks do
not observe xt directly, rather, they use a Kalman filter to form expectations about xt
based on the private noisy signals that they receive. We use si,
¯
t and scb,
¯
t to denote the
signals received at time
¯
t by private agents and the central bank respectively. Similarly,
we use Fi,
¯
t and Fcb,
¯
t to denote their respective conditional forecasts. The information
flow is sketched in Figure 1.
Agents can trade securities (e.g. futures contracts) based on it+h, the realisation
of the policy rate at time t + h. The price of a futures contract on it+h reflects their
aggregate expectation about xt, as follows
p
¯
t(it+h) = F
¯
txt+h + µt , (2)
7Derivations of the main formulas are in the Online Appendix.
7
Figure 1: The Information Flow
)( )(
¯
t
signals si,t = xt + νi,t
Ii,t = {si,
¯
t, Ii,t−1}
Fi,
¯
txt
t+ 1. . .
t− 1
rate it announced
Ii,t¯ = {it, Ii,
¯
t}
trade on Ft¯xt − Ftxt
t¯ . . .
period t
Note: Each period t has a beginning
¯
t and an end t¯. At
¯
t agents (both private and central bank) receive
noisy signals si,t about the economy xt, and update their forecasts Fi,
¯
txt based on their information
set Ii,t. At t¯ the central bank announces the policy rate it based on its forecast Fcb,
¯
txt. Agents observe
it, infer Fcb,
¯
txt, and form Fi,t¯xt. Trade is a function of the aggregate expectation revision between ¯
t
and t¯.
where µt is a stochastic component, such as the risk premium in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005),
or a stochastic process related to the supply of assets (see Hellwig, 1980; Admati, 1985).
At t¯, and conditional on its own forecast Fcb,
¯
txt, the central bank sets the interest
rate for the current period using a Taylor rule
it = φ0 + φ
′
xFcb,
¯
txt + ut + wt|t−1 , (3)
where ut denotes the monetary policy shock.
8 Also, the central bank can announce – or
leak – at time t − 1 a deviation from the Taylor rule, wt|t−1, that takes places at time
t.9 Having observed the current policy rate, agents update their forecasts, and trade
8Interestingly, the interest rate smoothing in the monetary policy rule arises naturally from the
signal extraction problem faced by the central bank. Indeed, it is possible to rewrite Eq. (3) as
it = [1− (1−Kcb)ρ]φ0 + (1−Kcb)ρit−1 +Kcbφ′xscb,
¯
t − (1−Kcb)ρut−1 + ut , (4)
where Kcb is the central bank’s Kalman gain. The policy rate at any time t is a function of current
and past signals, and of current and past monetary policy shocks.
9This announced deviation – that can be thought of as due to either implicit or explicit forward
guidance – creates a wedge between Taylor rule residuals and monetary policy shocks. Additionally,
Taylor rule deviations can also be autocorrelated and hence forecastable. In these cases, the monetary
policy shocks would be different from the residuals of a regression of the policy rate on central bank’s
private forecasts. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from such case in the model, while testing
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at t¯. Conditional on it−1, observing the interest rate is equivalent to receiving a public
signal with common noise s˜cb,t¯ from the central bank. Because of this forecast update
triggered by the policy announcement, the price of futures contracts is revised by an
amount proportional to the average (in population) revision of expectations, that is
pt¯(it+1)− p
¯
t(it+1) ∝ (Ft¯xt+1 − F
¯
txt+1) , (5)
where F
¯
txt+1 and Ft¯xt+1 are the average forecast updates that follow si,
¯
t and s˜cb,t¯.
Lemma. Following a central bank policy announcement, aggregate expectations revisions
evolve as
Ft¯xt − F
¯
txt =(1−K2)(1−K1)
[
Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt
]
+K2(1−K1)ξt +K2
[
νcb,
¯
t − (1−K1)ρνcb,t−1
]
+K2(Kcbφ
′
x)
−1 [ut − ρ(2−Kcb −K1)ut−1 + (1−K1)(1−Kcb)ρ2ut−2] ,
(6)
where K1 and K2 denote the agents’ Kalman gains employed in Fi,
¯
t and Fi,t¯ respectively,
Kcb is the central bank’s Kalman gain, ut is a monetary policy shock, and νcb is the central
bank’s observational noise.
Proofs are collected in the Online Appendix. Two emerging features of models of
imperfect information that have important implications for the identification of monet-
ary policy shocks are in evidence in Eq. (6). First, average expectation revisions (and
thus high-frequency surprises) – a direct measure of the shocks under full information
–, are orthogonal neither to their past, nor to past available information due to the slow
absorption of new information over time. Second, observable policy actions can transfer
information about economic fundamentals from the policy maker to market participants.
Indeed, as is visible in Eq. (6), agents update their expectations by extracting from the
policy announcement information about the structural shocks ξt. This is the ‘Fed in-
formation effect’ of Romer and Romer (2000) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), or
empirically for predictability and autocorrelation of residuals form an empirically estimated Taylor rule.
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the ‘signalling channel’ as in Melosi (2017), and also Tang (2013) and Hubert and Maule
(2016). The implicit disclosure of information can strongly influence the transmission of
monetary impulses, and the central bank’s ability to stabilise the economy. Empirically,
if not accounted for, it can lead to both price and output puzzles. In fact, a policy rate
hike can be interpreted by informationally constrained agents either as a deviation of
the central bank from its monetary policy rule – i.e. a contractionary monetary shock
–, or as an endogenous response to inflationary pressures expected to hit the economy
in the near future. Despite both resulting in a policy rate increase, these two scen-
arios imply profoundly different evolutions for macroeconomic aggregates, and agents’
expectations.10
Importantly, Eq. (6) provides us with testable predictions about market-based mon-
etary surprises: in the presence of imperfect information they are (i) serially correlated,
(ii) predictable using other macroeconomic variables, and (iii) correlated with the cent-
ral bank’s projections of relevant macroeconomic variables.
2 Testing for Imperfect Information
In this section we empirically document the three testable implications discussed in
the previous section. In particular, Tables 1, 2 and 3 report respectively the tests
for (i) correlation with the Fed’s internal forecasts, (ii) serial correlation, and (iii)
predictability with lagged state variables, for the leading instruments for monetary policy
shocks.
Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients and relative significance level of the pro-
jection of high-frequency market surprises in the fourth federal funds futures (FF4) over
Greenbook forecasts and revisions to forecasts for output, inflation and unemployment.
Specifically, we use the intraday movements in the fourth federal funds futures contracts
that are registered within a 30-minute window surrounding the time of the FOMC an-
nouncements, as proposed by Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005). These contracts have an average
10It is also worth noticing that the third term in Eq. (6) is the aggregate noise contained in the
policy announcement, due to the central bank’s noisy observation of the state of the economy. This too
can be thought of as another exogenous policy shift (see Orphanides, 2003).
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Table 1: Central Bank Information Channel
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Forecasts
h = −1 0.001 0.005∗∗
(0.004) (0.002)
h = 0 0.006 0.009∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
h = 1 0.001 0.003
(0.009) (0.004)
h = 2 -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.005)
h = 3 -0.004
(0.008)
Inflation Forecasts
h = −1 -0.009 -0.008∗
(0.006) (0.004)
h = 0 0.012 -0.000
(0.008) (0.005)
h = 1 -0.036∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.016) (0.006)
h = 2 0.040∗∗ -0.008
(0.020) (0.006)
h = 3 -0.018
(0.019)
Unemployment Forecasts
h = −1 0.002
(0.005)
h = 0 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.004)
h = 1 -0.000
(0.003)
h = 2 -0.003
(0.003)
h = 3
Output Forecasts Revisions
h = −1 -0.007 -0.010∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
h = 0 0.000 0.005
(0.008) (0.005)
h = 1 0.008 0.006
(0.011) (0.007)
h = 2 0.010 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010)
Inflation Forecasts Revisions
h = −1 -0.004 -0.002
(0.010) (0.009)
h = 0 -0.002 0.004
(0.010) (0.009)
h = 1 0.043∗∗ 0.018
(0.021) (0.012)
h = 2 -0.021 0.023
(0.025) (0.018)
Unemployment Forecasts Revisions
h = −1 0.068 0.053
(0.067) (0.065)
h = 0 -0.015 0.009
(0.047) (0.028)
h = 1 -0.098 -0.028
(0.076) (0.028)
h = 2 0.104 -0.023
(0.064) (0.029)
constant -0.011 -0.022 -0.040 0.005 0.016
(0.045) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.036)
R2 0.044 0.027 0.045 0.040 -0.004
F 1.651 2.024 2.636 2.436 1.045
p 0.039 0.065 0.018 0.027 0.398
N 186 186 186 186 186
Note: Projection of high-frequency market-based surprises on Greenbook Forecasts. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the 30-minutes adjustment in the price of the fourth federal
funds future (FF4) around all FOMC announcements in the sample 1990:2009. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Details on the specifications are reported in the text.
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maturity of about three months and settle based on the average effective federal funds
rate prevailing on the expiry month. Their price can therefore be thought of as em-
bedding markets’ forecasts about future policy rates. The regression is run at daily
frequency on all surprises registered between 1990 and 2009.
The first column corresponds to a regression similar to that in Romer and Romer
(2004), and includes: forecasts for output and inflation relative to the previous quarter
and up to three quarters ahead; nowcasts for the unemployment rate; and forecast revi-
sions for output, inflation and unemployment relative to the previous quarter and up to
two quarters ahead. We will use this specification for the construction of our instrument
in the next section. The null of joint non-significance of the coefficients is rejected at the
5% level. Results show that high-frequency surprises correlate with the central bank’s
private forecasts, in line with the intuition in our model.11 However, the interpreta-
tion of the individual coefficients is limited by the multicollinearity of forecasts for the
same variable at different horizons. In columns (2) to (5) we evaluate the predictive
content of forecasts and forecast revisions grouped by horizon. The null of joint non-
significance is rejected for all horizons up to 1 quarter ahead. Results suggest that the
information transfer is mostly related to the central bank assessment of the short-term
macroeconomic outlook. Moreover, output forecast have significant and positive coeffi-
cients. This is consist- ent with these regressors capturing aggregate demand shocks ?-
and their effect on prices via the Phillips curve. The negative coefficients on inflation
forecasts may capture the residual effects of supply shocks to which the central bank
may be less responsive.
A potentially important concern relates to the role of unscheduled meetings, where
the FOMC takes urgent decisions in moments of particular economic distress, as it
happened for example during the Great Recession. These unexpected meetings, that
coalesce markets attention, may in fact be the ones responsible for the information
channel. We address this concern by repeating the regression in Table 1 using market
surprises registered around scheduled FOMC meetings only, and found that results are
11Related results are in Barakchian and Crowe (2013), Gertler and Karadi (2015), Ramey (2016).
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Table 2: Serial Correlation in Instruments for Monetary Policy
FF4t FF4
†
t FF4
GK
t MPNt
instrumentt−1 0.065 -0.164∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.090) (0.057) (0.137) (0.091)
instrumentt−2 -0.025 -0.048 -0.164∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.119) (0.066) (0.073) (0.087)
instrumentt−3 0.145 -0.066 0.308∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.073) (0.150) (0.102)
instrumentt−4 0.179∗ -0.007 -0.035 0.075
(0.105) (0.068) (0.094) (0.102)
constant -0.016∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.015)
R2 0.026 0.001 0.168 0.172
F 1.459 2.279 2.965 7.590
p 0.217 0.063 0.021 0.000
N 167 167 166 152
Note: AR(4) for instruments in each column. From left to right, the monthly surprise in the fourth
federal funds future (FF4t), the monthly surprise in the fourth federal funds future in scheduled
meetings only (FF4†t), the instrument in Gertler and Karadi (2015) (FF4
GK
t ), the narrative series of
Romer and Romer (2004) (MPNt). 1990:2009. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
robust (Online Appendix).12
In Table 2 we report tests of autocorrelation in both high-frequency and narrative
instruments for monetary policy shocks. High-frequency surprises are aggregated at
monthly frequency using different schemes. The first column reports results for an
instrument defined as the sum within the month of all the FF4 surprises registered
between 1990 and 2009. In the second column only scheduled FOMC meetings are
included. The third column reports results for the instrument of Gertler and Karadi
(2015). Their monthly aggregation accounts for the date of the FOMC meeting within
the month, and weights the surprises by assuming a month duration for each event.13
In the last column of Table 2 we report results relative to the narrative instrument
of Romer and Romer (2004).14 The construction of the narrative instrument (MPNt)
12Results are robust to running the regressions over the samples 1994:2009 and 1990:2014. In 1994
the FOMC changed the way in which policy decisions were communicated. 2009 is chosen as the onset
of the zero-lower-bound (ZLB). 2014 corresponds to our latest available observation. All robustness
checks are reported in the Online Appendix.
13In particular, for each day of the month, they cumulate the surprises on any FOMC days during
the last 31 days (e.g., on February 15, we cumulate all the FOMC day surprises since January 15), and,
second, they average these monthly surprises across each day of the month. Equivalently, this can be
achieved by first creating a cumulative daily surprise series by cumulating all FOMC day surprises, then,
second, by taking monthly averages of these series, and, third, obtaining monthly average surprises as
the first difference of this series.
14We use an extension of this series up to the end of 2007 constructed following the same methodology
13
amounts to running a regression of the change in policy rate on central bank’s forecasts,
motivated by an empirical Taylor rule. The residuals are then used as a measure of the
shocks ut.
Results in Table 2 show that serial correlation is present in the series of high-
frequency surprises that are registered around scheduled FOMC meetings only (FF4†t),
in line with the intuition of our simple model of Section 1. A limiting factor in our
analysis is the fact that there are only 8 meetings scheduled in each given year cre-
ates missing values in the regression.15 The autocorrelation structure is weaker for the
series that also includes the non-scheduled FOMC meetings (FF4t). This is likely to be
due to the unsystematic nature of these events. On the other hand the high-frequency
instrument of Gertler and Karadi (2015) is strongly autocorrelated. This is partially
due to the weighting scheme used for the monthly aggregation discussed above, as also
observed in e.g. Stock and Watson (2012) and Ramey (2016). On balance, while not
fully conclusive, this evidence is compatible with the presence of information frictions
in the economy. Finally, the null is strongly rejected for the narrative series of Romer
and Romer (2004) (MPNt) (Stock and Watson, 2012).
In Table 3 we propose a test of predictability using past information. In partic-
ular, we project the different measures of monetary policy shocks on a set of lagged
macro-financial factors extracted from the collection of monthly variables assembled in
McCracken and Ng (2015). The dataset that we use for the factors extraction counts
over 130 monthly series that cover all the main macroeconomic aggregates, and a num-
ber of financial indicators. The factors enter the regressions with a month’s lag. Results
in Table 3 confirm the predictability of market-based monetary surprises using past
information. They also show that narrative accounts of ‘unanticipated’ interest rate
changes are similarly predictable by state variables which are a function of past struc-
tural shocks. This last result is consistent with the autocorrelation reported Table 2.
We also observe that it may be an indication of the fact that narrative instruments
of Romer and Romer (2004).
15As pointed out in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the OLS coefficients in the autoregression
can be biased as a consequence of the presence of noisy signals. The bias in our case is likely to be
negative (see Online Appendix, Eq. A.18).
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Table 3: Predictability of Monetary Policy Instruments
FF4t FF4
†
t FF4
GK
t MPNt
f1,t−1 -0.012∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.021)
f2,t−1 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.009
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
f3,t−1 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012)
f4,t−1 0.015∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023)
f5,t−1 0.002 -0.005 -0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.026)
f6,t−1 -0.011∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
f7,t−1 -0.010∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.005 -0.041∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
f8,t−1 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.028∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
f9,t−1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.036∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021)
f10,t−1 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.030∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
constant -0.014∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
R2 0.075 0.097 0.145 0.182
F 2.297 2.363 3.511 3.446
p 0.011 0.009 0.000 0.000
N 239 239 268 216
Note: Regressions include a constant and 1 lag of the dependent variable. 1990:2009. From left to
right, the monthly surprise in the fourth federal funds future (FF4t), the monthly surprise in the
fourth federal funds future in scheduled meetings only (FF4†t), the instrument in Gertler and Karadi
(2015) (FF4GKt ), and the narrative series of Romer and Romer (2004) (MPNt). The ten dynamic
factors are extracted from the set of monthly variables in McCracken and Ng (2015). Robust standard
errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
may also be contaminated by announced policy shifts, as is the case e.g. for forward
guidance.16 It is important to observe that factors are estimated using last vintage
data which are likely to incorporate revisions to early releases. While this may not be
information readily available to agents, it is worth to observe that this is an indication
of imperfect information. In fact, in a perfect information world, markets aggregate in-
formation efficiently, and there is no role for either data revisions or national accounting
offices. Taking stock of this evidence, in the next section we propose a novel instrument
that accounts for the presence of information frictions in the economy.
16See e.g. Eq. (3). Also, if the central bank sets the policy rate conditioning on other indicators
such as financial and fiscal variables (see e.g. Croushore and van Norden, 2017), the projection residuals
will also be endogenous to these variables. This again may show up as predictability with factors.
15
3 An Informationally-Robust Instrument
Accounting for the presence of information frictions, we define monetary policy shocks
as shifts to the policy rate that are both unforeseen by market participants, and are
not due to the central bank’s concerns about either current or anticipated changes in
economic conditions. Hence, building on the high-frequency identification of Gertler
and Karadi (2015) and on Romer and Romer (2004)’s narrative approach, we propose
a novel instrument for monetary policy shocks that takes into account both the slow
absorption of information in the economy, and the signalling channel of monetary policy
that arises from the asymmetry of information sets between the central bank and market
participants.
Specifically, we construct our instrument for monetary policy shocks as the com-
ponent of high-frequency market surprises triggered by policy announcements that is
orthogonal to both central bank’s economic projections, and to past market surprises.
We proceed in three steps. First, we project high-frequency market-based surprises in
the fourth federal funds futures (FF4) around FOMC announcements on Greenbook
forecasts and forecast revisions for real output growth, inflation (measured as the GDP
deflator) and the unemployment rate, as in Romer and Romer (2004), to control for the
central bank’s private information, and hence for the central bank information channel.17
We run the following regression at FOMC meeting frequency:
FF4m = α0 +
3∑
j=−1
θjF
cb
mxq+j +
2∑
j=−1
ϑj
[
F cbmxq+j − F cbm−1xq+j
]
+ MPIm. (7)
FF4m denotes the high-frequency market-based monetary surprise computed around
the FOMC announcement indexed by m. F cbmxq+j denotes Greenbook forecasts for the
vector of variables x at horizon q + j that are assembled prior to each meeting, and[
F cbmxq+j − F cbm−1xq+j
]
denotes revisions to forecasts between consecutive FOMC meet-
ings. The forecast horizon is expressed in quarters, and q denotes the current quarter.
These forecasts are typically published a week prior to each scheduled FOMC meeting
17Following Romer and Romer (2004) we only include the nowcast for the level of the unemployment
rate to mitigate the effects of the high correlation between output and unemployment.
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and can be thought of as a proxy of the information set of the FOMC at the time of
making the policy decision. For each surprise, the latest available forecast is used.18 This
first step delivers as a residual an instrument for monetary policy shocks (MPIm) at
meeting frequency that controls for the transfer of information that implicitly happens
at the time of FOMC announcements.
Second, we construct a monthly instrument by summing the daily MPIm within
each month. In the vast majority of cases, we only have one surprise per month; in
these cases the monthly surprise simply equals the daily one. Similarly, months without
FOMC meetings are assigned a zero. Equivalent aggregation methods are adopted in
e.g. Stock and Watson (2012) and Caldara and Herbst (2019).
Finally, we account for the slow absorption of information by the agents, that is a
trademark of models of imperfect information (see Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015),
by removing the autoregressive component in the monthly surprises. Let MPI t denote
the result of the monthly aggregation described in the previous step. Our monthly mon-
etary policy instrument MPIt is constructed as the residuals of the following regression
MPI t = φ0 +
12∑
j=1
φjMPI t−j +MPIt . (8)
We run the regression specified in Eq. (8) using only observations that correspond to
non-zero MPI t readings for the dependent variable. In months without meetings MPI t
is equal to zero.
The stylised model of Section 1 provides the intuition for the construction of our
instrument in Eqs. (7-8). The Greenbook forecasts (and revisions) directly control for
the information set of the central bank, and hence for the macroeconomic information
transferred to the agents through the announcement. Even in the presence of misspe-
cification in the empirical Taylor rule adopted in Eq. (7), central bank’s forecasts for
output, inflation and unemployment are likely to span the space of the macro shocks to
18For intermeeting decisions we use the last available forecast. In doing so we run the risk of not
fully controlling for all the transfer of information. In robustness tests, we also run Eq. (7) on scheduled
FOMC meetings only, and find that results are largely unchanged. Results are reported in the Online
Appendix.
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Figure 2: Informationally-robust instrument for monetary policy
shocks
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Note: market-based surprises conditional on private agents’ information set FF4t (orange line), residual
to Eq. (8) MPIt (blue line). Shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
which the monetary authority responds in setting the policy stance. This, together with
the lagged surprises, tackles the dependence of high-frequency instruments on other
contemporaneous and past macroeconomic shocks.19 In Figure 2 we plot the market
monetary surprise aggregated at monthly frequency by summing daily surprises (FF4t,
orange line) and the instrument constructed with our approach (MPIt, blue line). It is
worth noting that discrepancies between the two series are particularly evident during
times of economic distress.
4 The Impact of Different Identifying Assumptions
In this section, we explore the implications of the different information content of al-
ternative instruments for the identification of monetary policy shocks. The section is
organised as follows. First, we compare the dynamic responses identified using our in-
strument with two alternatives: the narrative series of Romer and Romer (2004), and
the high-frequency series of Gertler and Karadi (2015). Second, we compare impact
responses across instruments and model specifications. These can reveal contamination
19We report robustness of the effects of monetary policy shocks on the specification of Eq. (7) in
the Online Appendix. Results are robust to changing the set of regressors, so long as short horizon
forecasts (and revisions) are included.
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of the instruments by past shocks. Third, we evaluate responses to the endogenous
component of monetary surprises and show that they are compatible with the presence
of an information channel of monetary policy.
Dynamic Responses under Alternative Identifications. Figure 3 reports im-
pulse response functions to a monetary policy shock estimated in a VAR that encom-
passes those used in Coibion (2012) and Gertler and Karadi (2015). The vector of en-
dogenous variables includes an index of industrial production, the unemployment rate,
the consumer price index, a commodity price index, the excess bond premium (EBP) of
Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012), and the policy rate.20 By keeping the VAR composition
fixed, we can interpret the differences in the IRFs as an indication of the different inform-
ation content of the instruments used for the identification. The dashed teal lines report
the responses to a monetary policy shock identified using the high-frequency instrument
of Gertler and Karadi (2015) – FF4GKt . The orange (dash-dotted) lines are responses
identified using the narrative instrument of Romer and Romer (2004) – MPNt. Lastly,
the solid blue lines indicate the effects of a monetary disturbance identified using our
informationally robust instrument MPIt. In each case, we use the common sample
between the VAR innovations and the external instrument to estimate the impact re-
sponses.21 Table 4 reports first-stage F-statistics and reliability of the three instruments
for the VAR of Figure 3. We also include the original FF4t in the table for comparison.
All the instruments pass conventional tests for instruments’ relevance. We note, how-
ever, that these tests remain silent on the exogeneity of each; in fact, contamination by
other macroeconomic shocks could inflate the first-stage F-statistics. The three identi-
fications produce notably different responses in two respects: (i) the use of the narrative
instrument triggers an initial price puzzle and a subsequent non-significant response of
20Because our sample includes the zero lower bound, we choose the 1-year nominal rate as our policy
variable as in Gertler and Karadi (2015), and normalise the responses such that the shock increases the
policy rate by 1% on impact. All variables are monthly. Impulse response functions are from a VAR(12)
estimated in (log) levels from 1979:01 to 2014:12. The VAR is estimated with Bayesian techniques and
standard macroeconomic priors. The tightness of the prior is set as in Giannone et al. (2015). Results
on robustness to the sample are in Section 6. Details on the data used are in the Online Appendix.
21Identification with external instruments entails regressing reduced-form innovations onto the in-
strument. Because our instrument is a residual generated regressor, OLS-based inference is asymptot-
ically correct (Pagan, 1984).
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Figure 3: responses to monetary policy shock under different
identifications
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Note: 6-variable VAR. Shock identified with Gertler and Karadi (2015)’s average monthly market
surprise (teal, dashed), extended narrative measure of Romer and Romer (2004) (orange, dash-dotted),
informationally robust MPIt series (dark blue lines). The shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis
point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:1 - 2014:12. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage
bands.
Table 4: first-stage statistics: VAR of Figure 3
FF4t MPIt FF4GKt MPNt
F statistic 23.688 [12.23 29.09] 15.308 [9.61 16.75] 13.154 [5.07 19.70] 67.195 [53.59 75.75]
reliability 0.557 [0.41 0.57] 0.263 [0.20 0.28] 0.308 [0.21 0.34] 0.469 [0.42 0.50]
Note: top row: F statistics of the first stage regression of the reduced-form innovations on the
instrument. bottom row: reliability of the instrument. 90% confidence intervals in square brackets.
VAR composition: industrial production, unemployment rate, consumer price index, commodity price
index, excess bond premium, 1-year rate.
prices; and (ii) both the narrative and the high-frequency instruments elicit positive
impact responses of output and negative impact responses of unemployment, and hence
produce initial real activity puzzles. Conversely, the informationally robust instrument
gives rise to neither price nor output puzzles. Interestingly, industrial production drops
on impact and significantly contracts over the horizon of the IRF. Importantly, the
responses to a monetary policy shocks obtained with this identification are consistent
with standard macroeconomic theory: a contractionary monetary policy shock induces
a contraction in output, a rise in unemployment, and a reduction in prices.
We compare these responses with those in Figure 4, where identification is conducted
using the same three instruments, but the IRFs are estimated in a VAR with a slightly
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Figure 4: responses to monetary policy shock under different
identifications
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Note: 5-variable baseline VAR. Shock identified with Gertler and Karadi (2015)’s average monthly
market surprise (teal, dashed), extended narrative measure of Romer and Romer (2004) (orange, dash-
dotted), informationally robust MPIt series (dark blue lines). The shock is normalised to induce a
100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:1 - 2014:12. Shaded areas are 90% posterior
coverage bands.
Table 5: first-stage statistics: VAR of Figure 4
FF4t MPIt FF4GKt MPNt
F statistic 24.172 [13.24 30.14] 15.027 [9.47 16.71] 13.277 [5.43 19.26] 67.608 [54.52 74.85]
reliability 0.522 [0.38 0.55] 0.233 [0.19 0.25] 0.264 [0.19 0.27] 0.445 [0.40 0.47]
Note: top row: F statistics of the first stage regression of the reduced-form innovations on the instru-
ment. bottom row: reliability of the instrument. 90% confidence intervals in square brackets.VAR
composition: industrial production, unemployment rate, consumer price index, commodity price index,
excess bond premium, 1-year rate.
different specification of the information set. Specifically, we remove the excess bond
premium variable. The resulting VAR composition is a fairly standard one in empirical
macro, and matches those used in e.g. both Coibion (2012) and Ramey (2016) (first-
stage statistics for this VAR are reported in Table 5). In this new set of responses, the
IRFs obtained from the narrative and the FF4GKt instrument show a marked instability
when compared with the ones reported in Figure 3. Quite crucially, the puzzles be-
come more pronounced and long-lasting (see also Ramey, 2016). Conversely, responses
estimated with our instrument remain stable across the two specifications.
Three remarks summarise the comparison. First, both the narrative and the aver-
age market surprises produce responses that lack robustness to small changes to the
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information set, while the new instrument does not. Second, the narrative and the
average market surprises elicit either short- or long-lived output and price puzzles in
both specifications, while the new instrument does not. Third, the impact responses of
the narrative instrument and the average market surprises are not always coherent with
economic theory, and show signs of instability (notably for IP).
Impact Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks. To rationalise the results above, it is
worth recalling the assumptions under which it is possible to identify structural shocks in
a VAR by using external instruments (see Stock and Watson, 2018; Mertens and Ravn,
2013). For a correctly specified VAR able to capture the data generating process, and
assuming invertibility in the structural shocks,22 given an instrument zt it is possible to
identify a shock of interest – e.g. a monetary policy shock umpt – if
(i) E[umpt z′t] = φ, (9)
(ii) E[umpt z′t] = 0, (10)
where umpt and u
mp
t denote, respectively, the monetary policy shock and any other shock
in the system. These are the standard requirements of relevance of the instrumental
variable, and exogeneity with respect to other contemporaneous shocks.23 If also a
stronger lead-lag exogeneity condition holds, namely
(iii) E[uit+jz′t] = 0 ∀j 6= 0 and ∀i, (11)
then the effects of the shock of interest can be estimated in a single equation regression
without controls (LP-IV, Stock and Watson, 2018). The procedure delivers consistent
estimates, but it entails a loss of efficiency compared to the SVAR-IV.24
22The structural shocks ut are invertible if ut = A0εt, where A0 identifies the mapping between the
structural shocks and the reduced-form one-step-ahead forecast errors εt.
23Given these conditions, an alternative identification method entails adding the instrument to the
set of variables and ordering it first in a recursively identified ‘hybrid’ VAR (see e.g. Ramey, 2016).
Results would coincide, provided that the VAR is correctly specified, and hence only contemporaneous
shocks affect the residuals εt.
24An interesting case is that of partial invertibility. In this case, while the monetary policy shocks
can be recovered as a linear combination of the VAR innovations, the remaining structural shocks
22
Two observations are important to our discussion. First, even with an instrument
that fulfils the strict exogeneity condition of Eq. (10), the impulse response functions to
the shock of interest are correctly recovered only if the estimated VAR correctly captures
the data generating process. An incorrectly specified VAR, while still allowing for the
identification of the impact effects, would produce biased transmission coefficients, and
hence misspecified impulse response functions.25 Second, a VAR that does not correctly
capture the data generating process will yield residuals that are combinations of current,
past and future shocks. If the instrument violates the lag-exogeneity condition, the
impact responses, proportional to the projection coefficients of the VAR residuals on
the instrument, will be dependent on the VAR specification.
These two observations provide us with one additional testable implication of the
information channel of monetary policy actions. In fact, and importantly, in the pres-
ence of information fictions, standard instruments for monetary policy shocks can be
contaminated by current but also past macroeconomic shocks. Indeed, a strong implic-
ation of information frictions is the violation of the conditions in Eqs. (10-11). While
the former is not directly testable, the latter is, by looking at the dependence of the
estimated impact responses to the changes in the VAR information set. In fact, in this
case, not just the shape of the dynamic responses but also the estimated impacts will
depend on the VAR specification.
In light of these remarks, a partial explanation for the differences across the specific-
ations in Figures 3 and 4 comes from the fact that even in the presence of a strictly
exogenous instrument, an incorrectly specified VAR will still lead to misspecified dy-
namic responses. In fact, as persuasively observed in Caldara and Herbst (2019), the
introduction of variables that proxy for financial conditions (such as e.g. the EBP in
cannot (see Stock and Watson, 2018, for a discussion on invertibility and partial invertibility). In such
a case VAR residuals are going to be combinations of the current shocks but also potentially of lags
and leads of some of the other structural shocks. It can be shown that also in this case it is possible
to correctly estimate the dynamic responses to the monetary policy shock using external instruments,
under the condition that the instrument is orthogonal to leads and lags of all the other shocks that
enter the VAR residuals (a discussion on this point is in Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2018). This is
a stronger condition than Eq. (10), but is less restrictive than Eq. (11).
25The intuition for this is that a VAR be seen as a set of seemingly unrelated regressions. Hence, it
is possible to recover the impact effects by adopting an external instrument that is strictly exogenous.
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the first specification) produces overall more convincing responses, at least when using
high-frequency instruments. However, the fact that also impact responses can be both
counterintuitive and dependent on the VAR specification is primarily driven by con-
tamination of the monetary policy instruments induced by the central bank information
channel.
We further explore this issue in Figure 5, where we highlight the estimated impact re-
sponses of output and prices as we vary the instrument for identification (across columns
in the figure) and the composition and specification of the VAR (across rows in the fig-
ure). In each subplot, the impact response of the 1-year rate (GS1) is normalised to be
equal to 1. In each row, from left to right, the instruments used for the identification
of monetary policy shocks are the three we use in Figures 3 and 4: Gertler and Karadi
(2015)’s FF4-based average monthly market surprise; the narrative instrument of Romer
and Romer (2004); and our informationally robust MPI. To these we add: the sum of
FF4 surprises within the month; and the FF4 surprises registered around scheduled
FOMC meetings only. In the top and middle row of the figure, impact responses are
calculated from the innovations of the VARs of Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. In the
bottom row of the figure, we magnify the misspecification of the system by estimating
a VAR with two lags in the three variables displayed.
Results in Figure 5 provide empirical support to the argument discussed above.
Impact responses for different versions of the market-based monetary surprises vary
both in magnitude and sign depending on the VAR composition. For example, consider
the subplots in the second column (FF4). The impact response of industrial production
goes from being negative in the larger VARs, to being positive in the smaller system.
Similar considerations hold if one restricts the attention to scheduled FOMC meetings
only (column 3 of Figure 5): from the top to the bottom rows the impact response of
output shrinks by about two thirds. It is also worth noticing that this instrument elicits
a positive initial reaction of prices, regardless of the VAR specification. Results relative
to the average surprises of Gertler and Karadi (2015) and the narrative instrument of
Romer and Romer (2004) highlight the instability of impact responses in these cases, in
line with what discussed for Figures 3 and 4. Finally, impact responses estimated using
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Figure 5: Core Variables: Impact Responses
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Note: Impact responses to a monetary policy shock of core output and price variables. Top pan-
els: VAR(12), 6-variables; Middle panels: VAR(12), 5-variables; Bottom Panels: VAR(2), 3-variables.
Shock identified with external instruments. From left to right in each row: 1. Gertler and Karadi
(2015)’s average monthly market surprise; 2. narrative instrument of Romer and Romer (2004); 3.
informationally robust MPI; 4. sum of FF4 surprises within the month; 5. FF4 surprises at scheduled
FOMC meetings only. The shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate.
Sample 1979:1 - 2014:12. Grey bars are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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our informationally robust instrument are remarkably stable across the two specifications
and do not depend on the inclusion in the VAR of financial variables. The stability
of the results relative to the core output and price variables gives us confidence on the
exogeneity of our instrument. In the next section we employ the new instrument to study
the propagation of monetary policy disturbances on a large cross-section of variables.
The Information Effects. In Figure 6 we study how macroeconomic and financial
variables respond to the ‘informational’ component of the monetary policy surprises, as
captured by the fitted component of Eq. (7), aggregated at monthly frequency. The
responses capture the effect of central bank information about the short-term macroe-
conomic outlook that market participants extract at the time of the announcements.26
In this VAR, we also include the 10 year Treasury rate, the stock market index, and the
effective dollar exchange rate.27 In the figure, dashed lines are used for the responses
to the information component, while solid lines are the responses to a monetary policy
shock identified with MPIt.
In line with our argument, while the uncertainty around the information effects is
larger than for the monetary policy shocks – due to the intrinsic uncertainty associated
to central banks’s forecasts –, the difference between the responses elicited by the two
shocks is large and strongly significant. While both shocks raise the nominal interest
rate by the same amount on impact, the information shock is followed by an economic
expansion at business cycle frequency, consistent with the view that a rate increase
can signal to market participant that the central bank is expecting a stronger economy
going forward. Quantities and prices rise, the stock market rises in value, and credit
conditions ease. These results support the view that market participants extract from
central bank announcements information on the aggregate demand shocks to which the
central bank is likely to respond. Equivalent conclusions are reached using a different
but complementary methodology in Jarocin´ski and Karadi (2019). Monetary policy
26As discussed, the Greenbook projections at the short-horizon have the largest predictive power.
This is consistent with the maturity of the FF4 futures covering up to three months ahead. In order
to extract a proxy for the central bank information while minimising issues of multicollinearity, we
consider the fitted value of Eq. (7), where we limit the maximum horizon to 1 quarter ahead.
27The sample, lags and estimation procedure are unchanged.
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Figure 6: monetary policy shocks vs information effects
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Note: Responses to a monetary policy shock identified with MPIt (solid lines) and to the information
component in monetary surprises (fitted component of Eq. (7), dash-dotted lines). Both shocks are
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate on impact. Sample 1979:1 - 2014:12.
Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
surprises that contain both monetary policy shocks and demand shocks would blend the
two effects reported in the figure, and hence produce puzzles.
5 The Transmission of Monetary Disturbances
Monetary policy decisions are thought to affect economic activity and inflation through
several channels, collectively known as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
In this section we report our empirical results on the effects of monetary policy shocks
on a large number of variables, and provide evidence compatible with the activation
of several of the potential channels that have been discussed in the literature (see e.g.
Mishkin, 1996; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, for a review). Monetary policy shocks are
identified by using the MPIt instrument defined in Section 3. Results, in the form of
dynamic responses and obtained using a VAR(12) estimated with standard macroeco-
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nomic priors over the sample 1979:01-2014:12, are presented in Figures 7 to 9. Variables
enter the VAR in log levels with the exception of interest rates and spreads. The shock
is identified over the sample common to the external instrument (MPIt) and the VAR
innovations, and normalised to raise the 1-year rate (policy variable) by 1%. Shaded
areas are 90% posterior coverage bands. The VAR is estimated with Bayesian tech-
niques and standard Normal-Inverse Wishart priors. The tightness of the prior is set as
in Giannone et al. (2015).
In line with results shown in previous sections, a contractionary monetary policy
shock is unequivocally and significantly recessionary also in larger models (Figure 7).
Tight monetary policy depresses real activity and reduces prices. It is worth observing
that industrial production drops on impact, and the contraction is larger than what
reported in previous studies. Capacity utilisation and inventories both contract, with
peak effects often realised within the first year following the shock. The response of these
quantities can help explaining the sudden drop in industrial production – firms appear
to respond to tighter monetary policy by curtailing production while reducing inventory
holdings in order to fulfil shipments related to pre-existing orders. The labour market is
also significantly and negatively affected, but with delay. Both the unemployment rate
and total hours worked display muted responses on impact. This is suggestive of the
presence of frictions in the labour market, such as contractual obligations, which delay
the adjustments. Wages decline in a sluggish fashion, but the effect is estimated with
large uncertainty. Conversely, the contraction in prices, whether measured using the
CPI index or the personal consumption deflator, is more sudden. In line with models of
imperfect information and models in which a number of both real and nominal frictions
are at play (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007), prices do not fully adjust on impact, but
keep sliding over a few months to reach a negative peak of about half a percentage point
within the first six months after the shock.
Real income suffers a prolonged contraction that survives for over a year after the
shock. Real durable and nondurable consumption rise on impact to contract at medium
horizons, albeit not significantly. We explore the response of consumption more in detail
at the end of the section.
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Figure 7: The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
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Note: Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with the MPIt series
and normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:07 - 2012:12 due
to data availability (mortgage spread). VAR(12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure 8: Yield Curve Response to MP Shocks
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Note: Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with the MPIt series and
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:01 - 2014:12. VAR(12).
Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
The shock induces a significant impact rotation of the yield curve whereby for a 1%
rise in the 1-year rate, we see up to a 50 basis point contraction in the term spread.
Both responses are sudden and temporary: the increase in the policy variable dissipates
completely within the first two quarters. We explore further the details of the responses
of interest rates at different maturities in Figure 8. Here each subplot is horizon-specific,
and maturities (in years) are reported on the horizontal axes. All interest rates rise on
impact with responses that are both smaller in magnitude and quicker to revert to trend
the higher the maturity. The long end of the yield curve (20-year rate) does not move,
in line with what expected for the effects of a temporary monetary contraction (see also
discussion in Romer and Romer, 2000; Ellingsen and Soderstrom, 2001). All the curve’s
responses are not significant at the six-month horizon.
To better understand the strong real effects discussed above, particularly in light of
the relatively muted movements of the long end of the curve, we investigate the responses
of financial and credit variables. The effects reported in Figure 7 are consistent with
a deterioration of household wealth working through both a reduction of labor income,
and of financial wealth. The decline in financial wealth is likely the product of negative
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valuation effects triggered by the contraction in asset prices. The reaction of asset
prices is spread across different asset classes. The stock market suffers important losses.
Housing investment collapse, with peak contractions at the 10% mark. These effects have
a detrimental impact on both equity and assets valuation, making collaterals become
more costly.
The strong effects on both real activity and output are likely magnified by the re-
action of credit and financial markets, consistently with the ‘financial accelerator’ hy-
pothesis and the existence of a credit channel for monetary policy (Bernanke et al.,
1999). Lending dips significantly, particularly so for businesses. This is consistent with
a number of possible mechanisms, all of which find some degree of support. On the
one hand, it is the supply of credit that shrinks. Bank lending can contract for several
reasons. First, contractionary monetary policy reduces cash flows and increases indirect
expenses, with direct effects on the amount of new loans granted. Second, through its
effect on asset prices, contractionary policy has a direct valuation effect on lenders’ bal-
ance sheets. Higher rates mean lower net margins, and thus lower profits going forward.
Also, the drop in asset prices can imply a reduction in bank capital which may in turn
induce deleveraging in the form of less credit supplied (see Boivin et al., 2010). On the
other hand, however, the demand for credit may slow down due to borrowers being less
willing to undertake new investment projects. One important reason why this may be
the case is that borrowing costs rise. Following the shock, corporate bond spreads and
premia (the excess bond premium of Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012) both significantly
rise on impact, and remain high for about half a year. This is consistent with a surge
in the external finance premium, that is, the wedge between external (e.g. equity/debt
issuance) and internal (e.g. retained earnings) funding costs (see Bernanke and Gertler,
1995; Gertler and Karadi, 2015). Opposite to what discussed above, this mechanism
operates through the borrowers’ balance sheet: the lower the borrower’s net worth, the
higher the finance premium. Variations in the net worth affect investment and spending
decisions, with magnifying effects on borrowing costs, real spending, and real activ-
ity. The mechanism affects both businesses and households alike. The contraction in
housing investments and the increase in mortgage spreads concur to curtail lending to
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Figure 9: Response of Expectations to MP Shocks
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Note: Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with the MPIt series and
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1993:01 - 2014:12. VAR(12).
Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
households as well.
After the shock, the dollar appreciates suddenly, and in real terms, against a basket
of foreign currencies. This appears to also activate an exchange rate channel. In fact,
exports become more costly due to the appreciation, and contract as a result. Notwith-
standing the stronger purchasing power sustained by the appreciation of the domestic
currency, the ensuing recession, accompanied by a contraction of internal demand, also
makes imports contract, and significantly so.
Finally, we turn to the responses of private sector expectations, in Figure 9. As
observed in Woodford (2011), modern monetary policy is not simply a matter of con-
trolling overnight interest rates, but rather one of shaping market expectations of the
forward path of interest rates, inflation and income. To study how agents’ expectations
respond to policy changes, we augment a set of variables relevant for the analysis of the
standard interest rate channel with Consensus Economics forecast data.28
28The estimation sample in this case starts in 1993, due to limited availability of the Consensus
Economics forecasts.
Ftxt+12 =
h
12
Ftxt+h +
12− h
12
Ftxt+12+h,
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Industrial production and CPI are converted to year-on-year growth rates for ease
of comparison, to match the survey units. Agents’ median expectations adjust in line
with the deteriorating fundamentals. It is important to stress here that this result
follows only once the effects of the information channel are appropriately accounted
for. Conversely, as documented in Campbell et al. (2012, 2016) and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018), identifying disturbances using instruments that do not control for
such a transfer of information makes expectations adjust in the ‘wrong’ direction, as
agents interpret the interest rate move as an endogenous policy reaction to stronger
than expected economic developments. Consistent with theory, we find instead that as a
result of a contractionary monetary policy shock agents expect both inflation and output
to slow down over time. In particular, forecasts for prices, production, consumption
and investment are all revised downward, while the opposite holds for unemployment
forecasts. Interestingly, consistent with the literature on the presence of informational
frictions, we find that while the direction of the revision of expectation is in line with a
recessionary outlook, forecasters revise their assessment in a sluggish fashion. Notably,
while production falls by 4% in annual terms, the movement in the forecasts is more
gradual over the horizons. Annual CPI inflation drops by 1%, while agents revise their
forecasts gradually downward. This type of behaviour is compatible with information
being only partially and slowly processed over time. Conversely, with full information
forecasts should immediately adjust to shocks, and by the same amount as the variable
being forecasted (see discussion in Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012).
We conclude this section by providing some additional analysis on the responses of
consumption. Figure 10 reports the IRFs of nominal durable and nondurable personal
consumption expenditures, and of the deflator.29 Interestingly, nominal nondurable
consumption falls on impact and remains lower throughout indicating that the stickiness
in consumption plans may be larger than the stickiness in prices. However, this is
where Ftxt+h is the h-month-ahead median forecast of variable xmade at time t. The forecasts produced
by the respondents are {Ftxt+h, Ftxt+12+h} with horizons h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 12} and h + 12 months (see
Dovern et al., 2012).
29The VAR also includes the index of industrial production, the unemployment rate, the policy rate
and the S&P 500. The sample is 1979:1-2014:12, and the VAR is estimated with 12 lags using standard
macroeconomic priors.
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Figure 10: Nominal Consumption Expenditures
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Note: Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with the MPIt series and
normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:01 - 2014:12. VAR(12).
Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
not the case for durable goods. Some additional insight is offered by the responses
of retail sales of durable goods in Figure 11.30 Sales of most durable goods contract,
with the exception of electronics and appliances, and trucks. While not conclusive, this
evidence points to a mostly contractionary response of consumption, albeit with some
exceptions potentially due to heterogeneity across goods and/or consumers. Two forces
may be partly responsible for the ‘puzzling’ responses of electronics and appliances,
and of trucks. First, stores for electronics maybe actively trying to reduce inventory
not to hold a stock of good subject to rapid obsolescence. Second, a large fraction
of electronics and a decent fraction of intermediate goods used in the production of
vehicles are imported. The strengthening of the dollar vis a´ vis other foreign currencies
may induce a demand-augmenting effect for these goods. This effect is consistent with
the PCE deflator falling. While these hypotheses are just speculative, we leave further
exploration of these findings to future studies.
30This VAR is estimated on a shorter sample starting in 1992 due to data availability, and also
includes the index of industrial production, the unemployment rate, the policy interest rate, and the
S&P 500 index as additional endogenous variables.
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Figure 11: Sales of Durable Goods
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Note: Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with the MPIt series
and normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1992:01 - 2014:12 due to
data availability (disaggregated sales data). VAR(12). Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
6 Models and Subsamples
In this section, we assess the model and sample dependence of the results reported in
the previous sections. This is important in order to gauge how much of the lack of
stability of the dynamic responses reported in previous studies can be due to the use of
misspecified models or the time variation in the transmission coefficients, besides what
is accounted for by the identification strategy. In this respect, we follow the approach
of Ramey (2016).
Correct inference on the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks hinges on the
interaction between the identification strategy and the modelling choice. The correct
characterisation of impulse responses with an external instrument crucially depends (i)
on the properties of exogeneity and relevance of the instrument, and (ii) on the correct
specification of the dynamic model adopted. While condition (i) guarantees that impact
response are correctly recovered (and stable) for any model, condition (ii) is a necessary
condition in order to correctly estimate the propagation of the shocks over time (see
also discussion in Caldara and Herbst, 2019).
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Specifically, we assess the fragility of VAR-based results against models built to be
resilient to misspecifications of different nature; and we analyse the stability of the dy-
namic responses across rolling samples. Model misspecifications can arise along several
dimensions. First, the information set incorporated in small-size VARs can fail to cap-
ture all of the dynamic interactions that are relevant to the propagation of the shock
of interest. Second, the lag order of the underlying process may potentially be under-
estimated. Also, if the disturbances of the underlying data generating process are a
moving average process, fitting a low-order, or indeed any finite-order VAR may be in-
adequate. Finally, several possible non-linearities of different nature may be empirically
significant – such as time-variation or state-dependency of some of the parameters, and
non-negligible higher order terms.
We compare responses to shocks estimated by using our informationally robust in-
strument and changing the empirical specification and the samples. In particular, we
compare three specifications: (i) a standard Bayesian VAR; (ii) a Local Projection; and
(iii) a Bayesian version of the local projection. The rationale for these tests is as follows.
From a classical perspective, choosing between iterated VARs and direct methods such
as LPs involves a sharp trade-off between bias and estimation variance: the iterated VAR
method produces more efficient parameters estimates than the direct method, but it is
more prone to bias if the one-step-ahead model is misspecified. Hence, and especially
for short samples, VAR methods may produce responses that compound the estimation
bias over the horizons, while LP methods – albeit potentially robust to misspecification
–, are likely deliver highly imprecise estimates. Both these issues can be the cause of
‘puzzling’ responses and lack of robustness.
This bias-variance trade-off can be accounted for by adopting Bayesian estimation
techniques. Following this idea, we develop a Bayesian approach to Local Projection
(BLP) that optimally spans the model space between VAR-based and LP-based impulse
responses. In doing so, it helps assessing the source of potentially remaining puzzles that
are due to model specifications. BLP result from specifying a (Normal-Inverse Whishart)
prior for the local projection coefficients at each horizon, centred around the iterated
coefficients of a similarly specified VAR estimated over a pre-sample. The posterior
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mean of BLP responses takes the form
B
(h)
BLP ∝
(
X ′X +
(
Ω
(h)
0
(
λ(h)
))−1)−1(
(X ′X)B(h)LP +
(
Ω
(h)
0
(
λ(h)
))−1
BhVAR
)
, (12)
where X ≡ (xh+2, . . . , xT )′, and xt ≡ (1, y′t−h, . . . , y′t−(h+1))′. Intuitively, BLP regularises
LP responses by using priors centred around an iterated VAR, while allowing the data
structure to select the optimal degree of departure form the priors at each horizon. In
fact, extending the argument in Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2015), we treat the
tightness of this prior as an additional model parameter for which we specify a prior
probability distribution, and estimate it at each horizon as the maximiser of the posterior
likelihood, in the spirit of hierarchical modelling. This allows us to effectively balance
bias and estimation variance at all horizons, and therefore solve the trade-off in a fully
data-driven way. Details of this approach are provided in the Online Appendix and in
Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2015).31
In Figure 12 we compare the IRFs estimated using the three different empirical set-
tings. In the top row, we compare BLP and VAR responses. The bottom row compares
BLP and LP. The variables used are the same as in the baseline set of Figure 4 in Section
4.32 A few features emerging from this comparison are worth noticing. Overall, over
this sample, results are qualitatively consistent across methods: the policy rate returns
to equilibrium level within the first two quarters after the shock, and real activity and
prices contract under the three modelling alternatives. The length of the sample used,
combined with the small size of information set considered, also limits the erratic nature
of LPs. Because many sample observations are available at each horizon, the estimates
of projection coefficients are relatively well behaved in this instance. However, not-
withstanding the relatively long sample available for the analysis, LP responses quickly
31This approach has an alternative classical interpretation provided by the theory of ‘regularisation’
of statistical regressions (see, for example, Chiuso, 2015). Another approach to LP regularisation has
been proposed more recently in Barnichon and Brownlees (2016). A different Bayesian approach to
inference on structural IRFs has been proposed by Plagborg-Moller (2015). Barnichon and Matthes
(2014) have propounded a method to estimate IRFs using Gaussian basis functions.
32We set the number of lags in both VAR and LP to 12 and use the observations between 1969:01
and 1979:01 as a pre-sample to centre the prior for the BLP coefficients. The estimation sample goes
from 1979:01 to 2014:12. A detailed description of the method is in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 12: var, lp and blp responses
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top row: VAR (teal, dashed) and BLP (blue, solid) impulse responses. bottom row: LP (orange,
dash-dotted) and BLP (blue, solid) impulse responses. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
become non-significant after the first few horizons. The width of 90% LP confidence
bands dwarfs those of BLP responses, which are instead comparable to those of the VAR
(BLP responses are the same in the top and bottom row of the figure). For this set of
variables, and over this sample, the shape of LP and VAR responses displayed in Figure
12 is qualitative similar. VAR responses are, by construction, the smoothest, and have
tighter bands. This feature, however, also results in VARs implying stronger and more
persistent effects than BLPs (and LPs) do. Conditional on a very similar path for the
policy rate response, BLP-IRFs tend to revert to equilibrium faster than VAR-IRFs do,
and tend to imply richer adjustment dynamics. This may indicate that some of the
characteristics of the responses of the VAR may depend on the dynamic restrictions
imposed by the iterative structure, rather than being genuine features of the data.
We further explore the role that modelling choices play in generating puzzles by
focusing on short samples. Figure 13 compares the responses obtained using VAR, LP
and BLP over a set of 24-year subsamples from 1982 to 2014, using our novel instrument.
This exercise is helpful to assess how different methods cope with short samples and
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Figure 13: var, blp and lp responses across subsamples
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Note: top row: VAR(12) (blue, solid), and BLP(12) (grey, area) responses. bottom row: LP(12)
(orange, solid), and BLP(12) (grey, area) responses. Subsamples 1982:2006, ..., 1990:2014.
potentially severely misspecified information sets.33 The blue lines in the top row of the
figure are the VAR responses for each of the subsamples. Similarly, the orange lines
in the bottom row are LP responses in each of the subsamples. Conversely, the grey
areas in both rows cover all the space occupied by the BLP responses in those same
sub-periods. We abstract from estimation uncertainty.
A few elements are worth attention. First, the responses of the policy variable
are markedly more persistent when estimated with a VAR. In a number of occasions,
moreover, the policy rate stays above the 1% impact increase for over a year. Second,
the reaction of real variables to a monetary contraction is decisively recessionary for
BLP. The same does not hold for VAR responses which, in some cases, lead to puzzling
expansionary effects, with production increasing and unemployment decreasing after
the shock. Additionally, even when of the ‘correct’ sign, some of the VAR responses for
these two variables seem to imply equally puzzling exploding behaviours. Turning the
33For each subsample, the previous 10 years are used to calibrate the BLP prior. Hence, this exercise
also gives insights of the robustness of BLP to the choice of the pre-sample used for the initialisation.
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attention to the bottom row of the figure, we see how the erratic nature of LP responses
is exacerbated by the small samples used. In particular, we note that LP too can lead
to puzzling responses for both production and unemployment in some instances.
In summary, these results show that the responses we obtained in the previous sec-
tions after having corrected the monetary policy instrument for the information transfer
are robust to different model specifications. However, in small models and for short
samples, residual puzzles may still arise because of the limited ability standard methods
to cope with either misspecification (VAR) or estimation uncertainty (LP). Conversely,
models that can balance bias and estimation variance, combined with identifications
that account for the information structure in the economy, can deliver results that are
stable across information sets, samples, and the details of the model specification.
7 Conclusions
What are the effects of monetary policy? Despite being one of the central questions in
macroeconomics, and the numerous theoretical and methodological advances, the dis-
cussion on the effects of monetary policy appears to be still surrounded by a substantial
degree of uncertainty. In fact, not just the magnitude and the significance, but also
the sign of the responses of crucial variables such as output and prices depends on the
chosen identification strategy, the sample period, the information set considered, and
the details of the model specification.
This paper helps rationalising unstable and puzzling previous results by introducing
an identification strategy coherent with the intuitions stemming from models of asym-
metric and imperfect information. Results show that following a monetary tightening
economic activity and prices contract, lending cools down, and expectations move in
line with fundamentals. Moreover, the currency appreciates, and equity prices fall. Fi-
nally, the slope of the yield curve flattens, borrowing costs rise and so do corporate
spreads. These effects are both sizeable and persistent, suggesting that monetary policy
is a powerful tool for both economic stabilisation and financial stability. These findings
are robust to a number of severe tests.
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